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AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT 
STUDY COMMISSIONS 
CARL TOBIAS* 
During the 104th Congress, senators representing Pacific Northwest states 
mounted the fourth serious effort to split the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit since 1983.1 The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a 
bill that would have divided the court;2 however, the Senate eventually passed 
a measure which would have created a national study commission to analyze 
the federal appellate system. 3 This compromise was only one of several study 
proposals that Congress considered in 1995 and 1996. For example, California 
Governor Pete Wilson and Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain recom-
mended the establishment of commissions which would have assessed the 
Ninth Circuit.4 Nevertheless, Congress ultimately decided neither to authorize 
a commission that would evaluate the appeals courts nor to bifurcate the Ninth 
Circuit partly because each action proved to be rather controversial. 
Congressional failure to pass legislation which would have created a study 
commission or which would have split the court during the last two years does 
not mean that Congress will ignore these possibilities in the future. Indeed, 
many public officials who participated most actively in considering the study 
proposals and the circuit's possible division have clearly stated that they intend 
to have the 105th Congress seriously examine both prospects.5 The events 
described above and the difficulties which growing caseloads increasingly pose 
for the appeals courts suggest that it is an appropriate time to assess recent 
proposals for studying the appellate system. This essay undertakes that effort. 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. B.A., Duke University, 1968; L.L.B., 
University of Virginia School of Law, 1972. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris 
Trust for generous, continuing support. I serve on the Ninth Circuit Local District Rules Review 
Committee and on the Advisory Group that the United States District Court for the District of 
Montana has appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990; however, the views expressed 
here and errors that remain are mine. 
I. See SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, s. REP. No. 104-197, at 4-5 (1995). 
2. Id. at 11. 
3. 142 CONG. REC. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
4. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair, U.S. 
Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wilson Letter]; Ninth 
Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) 
[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Split], available in WESTLAW, Database CONGHRT, File No. 1995 
WL 10382809, at *29; see also Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split is Inevitable, but Not 
Imminent, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 947, 950 (1995) (repeating Judge O'Scannlain's recommendations). 
5. This assertion is premised on conversations with numerous participants and members of 
their staff. 
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The first section of the paper emphasizes congressional consideration of the 
Ninth Circuit's potential bifurcation while briefly describing legislative branch 
examination of appeals courts studies. The second part scrutin~zes four study 
commission proposals which public officials proffered. Finding that these 
proposals either would have afforded insufficient time for a commission to 
complete the work envisioned or would have been overly narrow in scope, the 
third section offers suggestions for a national commission which would 
analyze the appellate courts. 
I. ACTIVITIES OF THE 104TH CONGRESS 
Congressional activity relating to the possible division of the Ninth Circuit 
warrants considerable treatment here, although some features of the applicable 
history have been evaluated elsewhere.6 Moreover, assessment of relevant 
developments involving the appellate courts that occurred during the most 
recent Congress should enhance understanding of the study commission 
proposals which senators and representatives analyzed. 
Senators from Pacific Northwest states introduced a bill that would have 
split the Ninth Circuit in late May 1995.7 This measure's introduction 
constituted the fourth analogous effort to divide the appeals court in the last 
thirteen years.8 The proposal would have included Alaska, Idaho, Montana, 
Oregon and Washington in a new Twelfth Circuit and would have placed 
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands 
in the Ninth Circuit.9 The proposed Twelfth Circuit would have been assigned 
nine active judges and the new Ninth Circuit would have had nineteen active 
members, but Senate Bill 956 authorized no new judgeships. '0 
On September 13, 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
on S. 956, and the Committee received much cogent testimony from advocates 
and critics of circuit-division. 11 In a December Committee markup session, 
the Judiciary Committee approved an amendment in the proposal as introduced 
which would have left California, Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana 
Islands in the Ninth Circuit with fifteen judges and would have placed Alaska, 
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington, the remaining 
states of the existing Ninth Circuit, in a new Twelfth Circuit with thirteen 
judges. 12 
6. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 2; Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries--
Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such 
a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-
Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995). 
7. S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995) (setting forth an earlier 
proposed amendment to Title 28 of the United States Code). 
8. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 4-5; see also Baker, supra note 6, at 923-45 (chronicling 
early and modem attempts to divide the Ninth Circuit and listing the motivations for such efforts); 
Tobias, supra note 6, at 1363-75 (describing the historical proposals for splitting the Ninth Circuit 
and the arguments for doing so). 
9. S. 956, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). 
10. Id. § 3. 
11. See Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *1-69. 
12. See Markup of Pending Legislation: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 04th 
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The Senate and Committee members received and assessed numerous 
well-considered ideas that favored and opposed splitting the Ninth Circuit. 
Division's advocates stressed the problems which have purportedly resulted 
from the circuit's mammoth size. These encompassed the court's gigantic 
geographic magnitude, the Circuit's substantial number of judges (twenty-eight 
members), the court's massive caseload, and the substantial expenses of 
operating the circuit. '3 
Opponents of the court's division addressed the above arguments in 
several ways. They claimed that the circuit has instituted reforms which treat 
complications ascribed to size. 14 For instance, over a decade ago, the circuit 
created an administrative unit in Seattle where appeals can be filed and orally 
argued, and this change has proved responsive to the distances that counsel 
and litigants must travel. 15 Establishment of the projected Twelfth Circuit 
would not have modified this circumstance for many attorneys who now 
practice in the proposed circuit. Furthermore, critics suggest that the court's 
magnitude affords benefits. For example, it offers economies of scale, and 
provides considerable diversity both in terms of the complexity and novelty of 
cases, and in terms of the judges' gender, race, political views and geographic 
origins. 16 
Another important contention of circuit-splitting's proponents was that 
Ninth Circuit case law is inconsistent. The statistical possibilities for conflict-
ing opinions on a twenty-eight judge court seem significant because, for 
instance, 3,276 combinations of three-judge panels could resolve an issue. 17 
The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and experts who have analyzed the circuit 
have found insufficient inconsistency to warrant concem. 18 The court has 
correspondingly instituted measures to reduce conflicts. For example, the 
circuit's staff attorneys fully review every appeal and code into a computer the 
issues for resolution. The court then assigns to the same three-judge panel 
those cases which raise similar issues and are ready for resolution at the same 
time. 19 
Cong. (Dec. 7, 1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Markup]; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 2. 
13. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton); 
id. at S7505 (statement of Sen. Bums). 
14. See Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at * 15 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
15. See generally JOSEPH s. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE 
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT 13-14 (1985); Baker, supra note 6, at 929. 
16. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE FOR THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (6/22195) (1995) [hereinafter s. 956 POSITION PAPER]; Steve 
Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide the 9th Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12, 13 
(quoting former Chief Judge James Browning's assertion that court's diversity is an asset in 
response to previous attempts at splitting the circuit). 
17. See Baker, supra note 6, at 938; Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *10 (statement of 
Sen. Gorton). 
18. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 16, at 4-5; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and 
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 541 (1989). 
19. Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth 
Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 944-45, 957-58 (1980). 
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The third argument of S. 956's advocates was that the court's California 
judges, perspectives and appeals have dominated the Pacific Northwest.20 
This contention partly reflected the champions' dissatisfaction with Ninth 
Circuit decisions in fields, such as environmental law and the death penalty.21 
In prior attempts to divide the court, some opponents charged proponents of 
circuit splitting of acting primarily for political reasons, and of specifically 
engaging in "environmental gerrymandering."22 Critics also challenged the 
proponents' underlying premise that judges who were located in California 
were monolithic and idiosyncratic.23 Assessment of the judges' viewpoints 
and the computerized, random selection of three-judge panels made untenable 
efforts to stereotype the circuit's California judges.24 Finally, a majority of 
the court's active judges were not even stationed in Califomia.25 
There are certain additional ideas which proponents and critics enunciated 
in support of and against the Ninth Circuit's division. Critics emphasized that 
the proposed Ninth Circuit would have had a significantly less beneficial ratio 
of three-judge panels to appeals than the new Twelfth Circuit and a 
considerably less advantageous ratio than the current Ninth Circuit. Panels of 
the proposed Ninth Circuit would have annually faced 1,014 appeals and 
panels of the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually confronted 645 
cases, while panels of the existing Ninth Circuit addressed 868 filings in 
1994. 26 Critics also argued that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have 
imposed much new administrative expense and would have replicated 
functions which the Ninth Circuit now discharges satisfactorily.27 Moreover, 
opponents claimed_ that most active members of the court and many attorneys 
who practice before it opposed bifurcation.28 
Proponents of circuit-splitting urged that judges on a smaller court, such 
as the proposed Twelfth Circuit which would have had nine judges, would be 
more collegial, thereby enhancing efficiency.29 This proposition has some 
20. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
21. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504-05, (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statements of Sen. 
Gorton and Sen. Burns). 
22. See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 948 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 284, 
286 (1990) (statement of Sen. Wilson); Dan Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting "California" 
Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, June 12, 1989, at 2 (quoting former Chief Judge Goodwin). 
23. Baker, supra note 6, at 941; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1373. 
24. Baker, supra note 6, at 941-42. 
25. See THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 4, 22-93 (Marie T. Finn et al. eds., 
1995-96). 
26. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 16, at 5-6; see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT 
ExECUTIVE FOR THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN 0PPOSmON TO S. 
956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (12/7/95) AND COM-
PANION BILL H.R. 2935 (2/1/96) 3 (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter SECOND s. 956 PosmoN PAPER] 
(finding that reconfiguration, approved in December markup, meant that proposed Ninth Circuit 
would have annually faced 1065 appeals and proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually 
confronted 765 appeals). 
27. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
28. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 20-21; SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 26, at 5. 
29. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 10; see also S .. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (approving 
thirteen judges for proposed reconfigured Twelfth Circuit and fifteen judges for proposed 
reconfigured Ninth Circuit). 
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validity; however, additional evidence suggested that familiarity could lead to 
disadvantageous routinization and in certain situations might have fostered 
disagreement.Jo The circuit's small size may have concomitantly sacrificed 
the benefits of diversity and economies of scale that a bigger court offers. 
On March 18, 1996, a few of S. 956's advocates attempted to have the 
Senate consider the circuit-splitting measure as an amendment to federal courts 
appropriations legislation. Critics of the bill sharply attacked this effort on 
procedural grounds; however, senators participated in much substantive debate 
over the court's division.Ji Proponents and opponents ultimately agreed on a 
study commission proposal which received strong bipartisan support, and the 
Senate approved a commission on March 20.J2 Upon receipt of the Senate 
measure, the House assigned the proposal to the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration which Representative Carlos 
Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired; however, Congress took no final action on the 
Senate proposal during the 104th Congress. JJ 
II. ANALYSIS OF COMMISSION PROPOSALS 
A. The Senate Proposal 
The Senate proposal required that the commission "transmit its report to 
the President and the Congress no later than February 28, 1997" and that the 
Senate Judiciary Committee act within sixty days of the document's 
transmittal.J4 This measure was somewhat different than an earlier study 
commission suggestion that Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) had developed 
and offered as an amendment which the Judiciary Committee narrowly 
rejected during its December 7, 1995 markup.35 Senator Feinstein's proposal 
provided a two-year period for a commission to complete its analysis and did 
not require that the Judiciary Committee act on the commission report. 36 
The time frame which the March 21, 1996 proposal provided for the 
commission to conclude its assessment was insufficient at the time that the 
Senate approved it. An informative yardstick for evaluating this temporal 
consideration is the time which analogous study entities have required to finish 
similar projects. The Federal Courts Study Committee conducted the most 
recent analogous endeavor, and that entity consumed eighteen months in 
30. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 159, 168-
70 ·(1993). See generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29 (1994) (defining appellate 
collegiality and discussing what can be done to foster it). 
31. See 142 CONG. REC. S2219-48 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996). 
32. 142 CONG. REC. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). The Senate decision to leave the 
Ninth Circuit intact was advisable. Dividing the court would have been a limited reform, and it 
could have precluded implementation of numerous solutions which might prove more effective, 
such as realigning the existing regional circuits, establishing a third tier of appellate courts, or 
creating additional judgeships. 
33. See 142 CONG. REC. Hl 1644-01, HI 1859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). 
34. See 142 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
35. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); S. REP. No. 104-197, at 
20. 
36. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
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completing its work.37 Some federal court observers found this time period 
inadequate and ·suggested that the temporal limitation might have prevented the 
Study Committee from assembling an even better report.38 The Commission 
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission) 
undertook another similar endeavor, and this group concluded its study of the 
appeals courts after eighteen months.39 
Comparison of the March 21, 1996 Senate proposal with these prior, 
analogous study commission efforts thus suggests that the recent Senate 
measure would have allotted too little time for the proposed commission to 
complete the finest possible study. Legislative inaction, therefore, was 
probably advisable. Congress should not have established a commission which 
lacked adequate time to collect the most accurate data and to formulate the 
best suggestions. 
Rather similar difficulties involving scope also seemed to accompany the 
proposed commission's mandate which the Senate included in the March 21, 
1996 measure. This proposal provided that the commission's functions were 
to: 
(1) study the present division of the United States into the 
several judicial circuits; 
(2) study the structure and alignment of the Federal courts 
of appeals with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; 
and 
(3) report to the President and the Congress its 
recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries 
or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious 
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal 
Courts of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts 
of fairness and due process.40 
37. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]; see also Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644-45 (1988). 
38. Telephone Interview with Arthur Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh 
(June 1, 1996); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1408. 
39. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE 
GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE, 
reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter CIRCUIT BOUNDARY RECOMMENDATION]; see also 
Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807-08 (1973) (establishing the Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Appellate System of the United States). The Act required the Commission 
to report its recommendations regarding the geographical boundaries of the circuits within 180 
days after the ninth member was appointed and to report on the structure and internal procedures 
of the appellate system within 15 months of the date the ninth member was appointed. The Long 
Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference recently required over four years to 
compile its final long range plan; however, given the Committee's emphasis on long-term 
planning, that endeavor resembled less closely the March 21, 1996 proposal which the Senate 
considered than the Hruska Commission and the Federal Courts Study Committee. See JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 3 (1995); 
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
PROPOSED LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1995). 
40. 1.42 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
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The charge provided appeared overly narrow. For instance, the initial two 
mandates required the commission to analyze the country's present division 
into several appeals courts and the structure and alignment of the federal 
circuits "with particular reference to the ninth circuit"41 but did not speak to 
the increasing number of appeals which is the major complication that the 
appellate courts currently face. 42 The two strictures probably could have been 
interpreted, however, to include docket growth. 
The third command did specifically prescribe suggestions for improvement 
that would lead to "expeditious and effective disposition" of appeals.43 
Nevertheless, those recommendations for alterations were limited to "such 
changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for" prompt 
and efficacious resolution.44 Confining commission consideration to structural 
alternatives would have been too narrow. There are many other ways of 
treating the problems attributable to mounting caseloads which should not be 
described as structural. Examples are increases in the complement of judges 
authorized and measures, such as those implemented by the Ninth Circuit, 
which a number of appellate courts have instituted.45 Precluding commission 
consideration of non-structural options seemed unwise because it would have 
eliminated numerous apparently promising approaches. This circumstance was 
worsened because it was quite difficult to ascertain which measures would 
have appeared most efficacious until the commission that was established had 
carefully assembled, assessed and synthesized the maximum applicable 
information. 
B. Additional Ninth Circuit-Specific Proposals 
During the debate over the advisability of dividing the Ninth Circuit and 
of passing S. 956, Governor Wilson and Judge O'Scannlain offered separate 
proposals to create a commission to study the circuit. Governor Wilson raised 
the possibility of establishing a commission in a letter which he sent to 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, on 
the eve of the December 1995 Committee markup.46 Judge O'Scannlain 
mentioned the prospect during his testimony in the September 1995 Judiciary 
Committee hearing.47 
41. Id. The proposal that Senator Feinstein developed was similar, but it did not include the 
phrase "with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit." See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). However, "any national analysis of the appeals courts may well 
emphasize this circuit." See infra text accompanying note 59. 
42. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 109; THOMAS 
E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-51 (1994). 
43. 142 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
44. Id. 
45. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27-28; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1363-64, 1405-07; 
supra notes 15, 19 and accompanying text. 
46. Wilson Lener, supra note 4. 
47. See Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *29. 
72 DENVER UNNERSI1Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
Governor Wilson wrote Senator Hatch to register his "strong opposition to 
any split before an objective study is concluded as to whether a split will 
properly address the concerns that have been raised concerning the size of the 
circuit."48 The governor expressed the belief that such an analysis could 
"focus on the concerns raised about the Ninth Circuit and determine whether a 
split is the answer."49 By way of illustration, he observed that "reform of our 
habeas corpus procedures and reforms which curb frivolous inmate litigation 
may d9 more to address a growing caseload than splitting the circuit." 
Governor Wilson urged that "a study be commissioned to carefully examine 
the concerns raised about the Ninth Circuit and determine whether the 
concerns are legitimate and whether a change in the circuit's boundaries is the 
best method of addressing them."50 The Governor offered no additional 
specific recommendations regarding the study. Perhaps most salient was his 
clear suggestion that the evaluation be limited in scope to the Ninth Circuit. 
Judge O'Scannlain proposed that Congress "direct the Circuit judges of 
the Ninth Circuit to reflect over the next few years and then to recommend, as 
did the judges on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1980s, what the 
proper division of their circuit should be."51 He proposed that the Ninth 
Circuit judges' suggestion be premised on an assessment of those 
considerations which would best enable the court to fulfill its objectives in the 
future. 52 Judge O'Scannlain urged that any Ninth Circuit realignment or 
restructuring insure accountability to all individuals whom the court now 
serves.53 He admonished champions of prompt circuit bifurcation that there 
had been "no recent systematic evaluation of the division of the Ninth 
Circuit ... since the ... [Hruska] Commission report in the 1970s."54 
The problem with the studies which Governor Wilson and Judge 
O'Scannlain proposed was that their geographic scope would have been overly 
narrow. An assessment confined to the Ninth Circuit would by definition have 
been incomplete. The major difficulties that most of the circuits and the 
appellate system now face involve increasing caseloads, and these problems 
are essentially systemic complications which will probably require systemic 
treatment. A study that encompassed solely the Ninth Circuit, therefore, 
necessarily would have failed to address all of the difficulties being 
experienced and would have resulted in only partial recommendations. Had 
Congress implemented remedies which applied only to the Ninth Circuit, those 
48. Wilson Letter, supra note 4. For a sense of the divergent views regarding the size of the 
Ninth Circuit see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
49. Wilson Letter, supra note 4. 
50. Id. 
51. Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *29; see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1361-62 
(analyzing the decision to divide the Fifth Circuit). 
52. Ninth Circuit Split, supra ~ote 4, at *29. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. For the first set of recommendations by the Hruska Commission regarding boundaries 
for the circuits, see CIRCUIT BOUNDARY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 39. For a brief historical 
treatment of the Hruska Commission see Baker, supra note 6, at 924-26 and Tobias, supra note 6, 
at 1361-63. 
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measures could well have precluded subsequent effectuation of more 
comprehensive solutions. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTURE 
The material in the second segment of this essay indicates that the time 
frame provided for concluding the commission's work and that entity's 
charter, which the Senate prescribed in the March 20, 1996 proposal, were too 
circumscribed. The study suggestion that Senator Feinstein developed was 
responsive to temporal concerns because it afforded two years for completion 
of the effort; however, the analysis which she recommended would have been 
only marginally broader in scope than the Senate measure.ss The evaluations 
that Governor Wilson and Judge O'Scannlain suggested would correspondingly 
have been too limited in terms of their geographic compass.s6 
The difficulties which attended these study proposals do not necessarily 
mean that national examination of the appellate courts is inadvisable. Indeed, 
there is an important need to assess the appeals courts before growing dockets 
overwhelm the system and additionally undermine the quality of appellate 
justice dispensed by, for instance, further reducing the number of oral 
arguments granted or published opinions issued.s7 
When the 105th Congress considers proposals for studying the appeals 
courts, it should broadly view the temporal aspect, and the scope, of projected 
commission efforts. The time required for completing prior similar 
assessments, namely the Hruska Commission and the Federal Courts Study 
Committee, indicates that Congress ought to provide any commission proposed 
at least eighteen months, but probably two years, to finish its work. This time 
frame should permit the entity to collect, analyze and synthesize the maximum 
relevant material and to develop the most effective suggestions. 
Congress could rather felicitously enlarge the evaluation's scope by 
omitting the limiting commands that the Senate imposed in the mandate for 
the projected commission which the Senate considered during 1996. For 
example, the "study" restrictions regarding "structure and alignment" as well 
as respecting the Ninth Circuit included in the Senate measure,ss the latter of 
which resembled the Ninth Circuit limitation articulated by Governor Wilson 
and Judge O'Scannlain, might be deleted. However, the considerations, 
principally involving the Ninth Circuit's magnitude, which I surveyed 
earlier9 mean that any national analysis of the appeals courts may well 
emphasize this circuit. The "recommendations" stricture regarding "changes in 
55. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 35 and 36 and text of note 41 (discussing Sen. Feinstein's proposal). 
56. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. 
57. For 12 month's data on the disposition of cases heard by the appeals courts through 
September 30, 1995, see LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, tbl. S-1, at 28; tbl. S-3, at 30 (1995). See generally Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: 
Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25-32 (arguing that 
burgeoning caseloads cause a "dilution of appellate justice in individual cases"). 
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
59. See supra notes 13, 17 and accompanying text. 
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circuit boundaries or structure" in the Senate measure should concomitantly be 
omitted.60 
The suggestions that I propose will allow any commission which Congress 
authorizes to study all of the significant problems confronting the appellate 
courts, to scrutinize a plethora of potential solutions, and to recommend those 
modifications which seem most efficacious. 
CONCLUSION 
The Senate passed a measure in the 104th Congress that would have 
instituted a national commission to evaluate the federal appellate system. 
Senator Feinstein developed an analogous proposal that would have afforded 
greater time for a study, while Governor Wilson and Judge O~Scannlain called 
for analysis of the Ninth Circuit. The difficulties facing the appellate courts 
deserve systemic assessment and probably require systemic treatment, but all 
of the evaluations suggested were too narrow in terms of both time allocated 
and scope. When Congress considers the prospect of establishing a study 
commission during 1997, it should seriously examine the possibilities of 
allotting considerable time for the entity to conclude its study and of 
prescribing an expansive commission charter. Those improvements would 
facilitate compilation of the most-and most accurate---data, analysis of a 
broad spectrum of potential solutions and formulation of the most defensible 
suggestions. 
60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
